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Article 3

PROPOSAL II AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN
STATE LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
Carl A. Auerbach*
Shortly after President Eisenhower asked Congress, in May, 1953, to permit the personal income tax cuts scheduled for January 1, 1954, to go into
effect, I had occasion to lunch with Thurman Arnold. I asked Mr. Arnold
what he thought of the impending tax cut and he replied, "Fine, we can enjoy it privately and kick like hell publicly." Remember, this was before we
were told by President Kennedy and President Johnson that what we can do
most for our country is to pay less taxes.
My initial reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr'
was like Thurman Arnold's response to President Eisenhower's first venture
into deficit financing. As a private citizen, suburbanite and member of the
Democratic Party, I relished the result. But as a student of constitutional
law, I agreed with Mr. Justice Frankfurter that legislative apportionment
was none of the Supreme Court's business. I intended to kick about it publicly - at this symposium, in fact.
However, as I studied the three so-called states' rights amendments to
which our symposium is devoted, I came to doubt my original conclusion that
the Supreme Court had overstepped the bounds of its proper role in our
democracy when it decided Baker v. Carr.
Provisions of Proposal II. For our immediate purpose, however, it is important to point out that even those who agree with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr have reason to oppose the constitutional
amendment which purports to overrule the Court's decision in that case. For
the proposal - which I shall refer to as Proposal II - goes far beyond its
alleged purpose. Section 2 of Proposal II provides that:
The judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any
suit in law or equity, or to any controversy, 2relating to apportionment of representation in a state legislature.
This section, however, is ancillary to the basic aim of Proposal II set forth in
Section 1, which provides that:
No provision of this Constitution, or any amendment thereto,
shall restrict or limit any state in the apportionment of representation in its legislature3

ProposalI1 and the State Courts. If Proposal II contained only its second
section and, thus limited, became part of the Constitution, the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI would still obligate the state courts to decide apportionProfessor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; A.B., Long Island University;
LL.B., Harvard Law School.
1 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 The texts of the three states' rights amendments are set forth in State Government,
Winter 1963, p. 10.
3 Ibid. Section 3 of Proposal II provides that the proposed amendment "shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several states within seven years from the date of its submission." Ibid.
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ment cases in the light of the requirements of the federal Constitution. In all
likelihood, then, the state courts would not interpret these requirements uniformly, with the anomalous result that the existence and vindication of federal
constitutional guarantees would depend upon the immaterial circumstance of
where the case was brought.
Granting, then, that the proposed limitation on the federal judicial power
is justified, it makes sense to impose the same limitation upon the state courts
so far as the enforcement of federal constitutional guarantees is concerned.
This may have been all that the draftsmen of section 1 of Proposal II intended.
But as drafted, section 1 would accomplish a great deal more than even its
supporters have not sought to defend.
Proposal 11 and Racial Discrimination.Dissenting in South v. Peters, Mr.
.Tustice Douglas remarked: "I suppose that if a State reduced the vote of
Negroes, Catholics, or Jews so that each got only one-tenth of a vote, we would
strike the law down." 4 But if these shameful objectives were achieved under
the guise of state laws apportioning representation in state legislatures, section
1 of Proposal II would not only bar the federal courts from striking the laws
down, but would also bar the state courts from striking the laws down under
the authority of the federal Constitution.
We are not dealing with a remote contingency. If Proposal II had been
in effect, no court could have prevented the racial discrimination which the
Alabama legislature tried to perpetrate in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.5 The Alabama
courts would have been bound by state law. Speaking for the Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, Mr. Justice Frankfurter held that federal court intervention was warranted precisely because abstention "would sanction the achievement by a State of any impairment of voting rights whatever so long as it
was cloaked in the garb of the realignment of political subdivisions."'
Clearly, then, Proposal II would abridge the national guarantees of equality
imbedded in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. But surely we will not permit the long, historic, and increasingly
successful struggle of the Negro citizen for the right to vote to culminate -i
districting and apportioning schemes which deprive him of the fruits of victory.
ProposalII and CongressionalPower. Under Proposal II, the Congress of
the United States would also be deprived of authority to take action against
the kind of racial discrimination involved in Gomillion v. Lightfoot. Section 1
would strip Congress of its powers under the enforcement sections of the three
Civil War Amendments whenever legislative districting or apportionment was
used as the vehicle for discrimination.
ProposalH and PresidentialPower. Proposal II is aimed at the President,
as well as Congress. It would curtail the powers of the President and Congress
under Article IV, Section 4 of the federal Constitution which requires that
the "United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
form of government." I agree with Mr. Justice Frankfurter that the Tennessee
4 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950).
5 364 U.S. 339 (1960).

6 Id. at 345.
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citizens and voters who brought suit in Baker v. Carrwere asserting "a Guarantee Clause claim." 7 As Professor Willard Hurst has written:
No issue is more at the heart of "a Republican form of government" than the basis on which men and women are represented
in their legislature. Indeed, fair representation in a freely elected
legislature is what is meant by "a Republican form of government."81
On no other basis, I would add, is there government with the consent of the
governed.
The apparent aim of the advocates of Proposal II, to preserve the past
rulings of the Supreme Court that the Guarantee Clause is not judicially enforceable, does not justify the obliteration of Congressional and Presidential
power to enforce the Clause. It is not inconceivable that in a time of strife,
districting and apportionment of representation in a state legislature might become the instruments of totalitarian rule in a particular state. It is pointless
to insist that this will never happen here, or that, if it does, the President and
Congress will act anyway, with or without an amendment. Professor Hurst
reminds us that:
A constitution has no more important function than to provide
an accepted, legitimate framework of values and procedures within
which men may confront crisis ....
In declaring that no agency
of the federal government may concern itself with subversion of
the key element of the republican form of government of a state
of the Union, the proposed amendment would reverse a basic value
judgment written into the Constitution of the United States. In
doing so the proposal would depart from a wise conservatism.9
It is impossible to know whether the advocates of Proposal II really intend to write into the Constitution the principle that it shall never be the nation's business how a state apportions representation in its legislature. That
many of its supporters intend precisely such a result is evidenced by the fact
that they insist on describing the three proposals as states' rights amendments.
By now, however, their intent is immaterial. As of June 17, 1963, Proposal
II, as presently worded, passed both houses of thirteen state legislatures (Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Washington and Wyoming) and one
house of two state legislatures (Colorado and Mississippi). It also passed the
unicameral legislature of Nebraska but was vetoed by Governor Frank Morrison. Both houses of the Utah legislature adopted a resolution somewhat different
in language from that of the standard Proposal II.
ProposalII and States Rights. Is Proposal II a states' rights amendment?
This depends upon how we define "states' rights." It is a fact, however, that
the Advisory Commissions on Intergovernmental Relations under both the
Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations blamed malapportionment in large
part- for the relative decline of state governmental power. In 1955, the Kestnbaum. C6mmission warned:
7 369 U.S. at 289-97.
8 Hurst, Memorandum Regarding Pending Proposals to Amend the United States Constitution, 36 Wis. BAR BULL. No. 4 (1963), pp. 7, 11.
9 Ibid.
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If states do not give cities their rightful allocation of seats
in the legislature, the tendency will be toward direct Federalmunicipal dealings. These began in earnest in the early days of
the depression. There is only one way to avoid this in the future.
It is for the states to take an interest in urban problems, in metropolitan government, in city needs. If they do not do this, the
cities will find a path to Washington as they did before, and this
time it may be permanent, with the ultimate result that there
may be a new governmental arrangement that will break down
the constitutional pattern which has worked so well up to now.
One result of State neglect of the reapportionment problem
is that urban governments have bypassed the States and made direct
cooperative arrangements with the National Government in such

fields as housing and urban development, airports, and defense
community facilities. Although necessary in some cases, the multiplication of National-local relationships tends to weaken the State's
proper control over its own policies and its authority over its own
political subdivisions.
Paradoxically enough, the interests of urban areas are often
more effectively represented in the National legislature than in

their own State legislatures.1 °
The present Advisory Commission similarly fears the "eclipse of state
government because the people will turn to a more broadly responsive National
Government to obtain their needs" if "minority interests are permitted to control the legislative branch of State Government.... .""
Yet those who raise the banner of states' rights to justify Proposal II are
not eager to make state government stronger and more responsible so that it
will be able and willing to cope with the problems which now receive either
national attention or no attention at all. For them, states' rights is synonymous
with state inaction. Their only complaint is that state inaction is not accompanied by federal inaction, which is their ultimate goal.
Enactment of Proposal II would assure continued state inaction. It would
also have profound implications for our federal system, particularly if the
proposed method of amending the Constitution is also adopted. As a first
step, for example, the minorities controlling the state legislatures could reach
out to alter the popular character of the Presidency by changing the composition
of the Electoral College. Obviously, these so-called states' rights amendments
impinge upon vital national interests.

Proposal II and the Presuppositions of Democratic Government. These
proposals for constitutional change have more general and, for a constitutional lawyer, more absorbing implications. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes taught
us that behind "the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which
limit and control." 12 I have argued elsewhere that Article V of the Constitution postulates the illegitimacy of an amendment which would destroy the
democratic character of our system of governmentfor example, an amend10DENT

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESI-

39-40 (1955).

11 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT ON APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEoISLATURES 71, 24-28 (1962).
12

Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
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ment, even if supported by a majority of the people, which would establish
the framework for totalitarian dictatorship in the United States."3 Certainly
such an amendment would upset the basic system of government envisaged
in the Constitution at least as much as an amendment depriving the states,
without their consent, of their equal representation in the Senate - which
Article V prohibits expressly. That the federal government will remain republican in form is a postulate on which the whole Constitution is based; there
was no need to make it explicit.
I am not suggesting that the Supreme Court should undertake to declare
that certain amendments to the Constitution are unconstitutional. The Court
itself would probably not survive the kind of change in government I am supposing. But the people would then have the moral right to overthrow the anticonstitutional totalitarian government established by constitutional amendment.
What has all this to do with Proposal II? Let us see. Under Proposal II,
minority rule of state legislatures could be perpetuated. Congress, the President
and the federal courts could do nothing about it. Nor could the people remedy
the situation in any state in which the state Constitution may be amended only
at the initiative, or under the control, of the state legislature. Based on past experience, too, the state courts cannot be relied upon for assistance even in cases
in which minority state legislatures ignore state constitutional provisions governing state legislative apportionment.
The critics of Baker v. Carr may protest that I am assuming its correctness and that a particular system of districting or apportionment can be said
to enthrone minority, rather than majority, rule. But surely some systems of
districting and apportionment can easily be imagined which, even the critics
of Baker v. Carr would have to agree, do impose minority rule. In any case,
the crucial point is that adoption of Proposal II, together with the proposal
to revise the method of amending the Constitution, would make it impossible
for those who think that each state legislator should represent an approximately
equal number of people from ever having their way. No matter how large a
majority of the people they might win to their view, the path of further constitutional amendment could be closed to them by the minority legislatures
of no more than thirteen states. 4 It is inconsistent with the presuppositions of
democratic government to make the possibility of peaceful change depend exclusively on the ability of the majority to persuade the minority to abdicate its
power.
How then can the advocates of Proposal II ever win by constitutional
means? They can not and should not win, if we adhere to democratic principles.
Every principle of democracy is flouted if a minority of the people effectuates
constitutional change in a manner which perpetuates its rule.
A Look at Baker v. Carr. Would there be more to say for Proposal II if
13 See Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory
of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 173, 186-202 (1956).
14 It should be recalled that the proposal to revise the method of amending the Constitution would abolish the alternative now provided by Article V of submitting amendments proposed by two-thirds of each house of Congress for ratification by conventions in three-fourths of
the states.
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it had left intact the power of Congress and the President to act under the
Guarantee Clause and Congress' power to enforce the Civil War Amendments?
The answer to this question brings us closer to the merits of Baker v. Carr
and to Mr. Justice Jackson's question as "to what extent Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution will or can preserve the free government of
which the Court is a part."' 5
Before considering these questions briefly, I should say - in partial sym-

pathy with the draftsmen of Proposal II -

that it is difficult to draft a con-

stitutional amendment overruling Baker v. Carr which would not have undesirable side effects. An editorial in the Journal of the American Judicature
Society highlights one of the inevitable bad effects:
[IT]here is something very wrong in a movement to remove a
court's jurisdiction to speak simply because of dissatisfaction with
the way it has spoken. To do this is to attack not only the rule
that was announced but also the court that announced it, and this
is something we do not believe Americans really want to do. 6
To this criticism, Dean Fordham adds:
Were the approach freely used, the generality of the Constitution would be destroyed by a scatteration of specific denials
of power having no necessary sensitivity to the basic theory and design of the Constitution."
While I approve these sentiments in general, I do not think they are
pertinent here. The principled opposition to Baker v. Carr - voiced by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter - is based on the argument that the issue of apportionment is not justiciable. From this standpoint, the principled purpose of a constitutional amendment overruling Baker v. Carr is to save the Court from itself. This purpose can be shared even by those who would like to see apportionment based exclusively on population. Such advocates of a constitutional
amendment overruling Baker v. Carr would not necessarily be interested in
writing into the federal Constitution any particular principle or rule for state
legislative districting and apportionment. They would merely want to get the
Supreme Court out of the "political thicket." How else can this objective be
attained except by an amendment withdrawing the Court's jurisdiction over
the kind of controversy involved in Baker v. Carr?
In judging the wisdom of the Court's involvement in apportionment issues,
it must be remembered that the evils of malapportionment have been with
us since the turn of the century. For more than 60 years, they have been ignored by a good many state legislatures and by the Congress of the United
States. In Baker v. Carr, the Court pointed out, the Tennessee legislature, since
1901, had ignored the requirements of the State constitution that both houses
of the legislature, with minor modifications, should be apportioned according
to population. There was no provision for popular initiative and referendum.
to impose a new districting and apportionment plan. And the state courts
had declined to afford any relief. Resort to the federal courts was the last
15 JACKSON, TE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 57-58
(1955).
.16 47 J. AMER. JuI. Soc'y 4-5 (June, 1963).
17 Fordhamn, The States in the Federal System - Vital Role or Limbo?, 49 VA. L. REv.
666, 672 (1963).
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hope of the Tennessee citizens and voters who sought to revitalize the democratic process in Tennessee. In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court made itself
and the lower federal courts available for this purpose. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, would have acknowledged that "there is not under
our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political mischief, for every undesirable exercise of legislative power."'"
No case was more likely to draw a sharp and bitter line between the
"judicial activists" and the advocates of "judicial self-restraint" - and it did.
So it is not surprising that Professor Emerson, representing the judicial-activist
wing of the Yale Law School, should hail Baker v. Carr as "indeed a 'massive
repudiation' of the school of thought of which Mr. Justice Frankfurter has
been the intellectual and spiritual leader."' 9 Professor Bickel, representing those
at Yale who extol the Court's "passive virtues," retorts: "It is an irony . . .
that the super-democrats should look to the unrepresentative courts for an
arbitrary decision that they resent when it is made by a faulty representative
legislature, acting in concert with a majoritarian governor."'" I do not find
my views compatible with those of Professor Emerson or Professor Bickel.
I agree with Mr. Justice Frankfurter that our system of judicial review
"is a deliberate check upon democracy through an organ of government not
subject to popular control."" I am also a majoritarian - so long, I should again
add, that no existing majority seeks to close the avenues of peaceful change to
all future majorities. But I agree with Professor Hook that the "dictatorship
of the majority" is a "bugaboo which haunts the books of political theorists
but has never been found in the flesh in modern history."" Consequently,
I do not think that a Supreme Court declaration of constitutionality is needed
to confer legitimacy upon an act of the legislature.' Furthermore, it is positively baneful to assume that because the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of a legislative act, it must be a good or wise measure. The legislature in a democracy should be able to make a fool of itself and still be accountable for its foolishness only to the people.
Nor do I look exclusively to the Supreme Court to be "the pronouncer
and guardian" of the "enduring values" of our society. 4 As I reflect upon
our history, I must conclude that the enduring values of our society have been
embodied more in the acts of our legislatures than in the decisions of the Supreme Court declaring some of these acts unconstitutional." Let us not forget
18 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962).
19 Emerson, Malapportionmentand Judicial Power, 72 YALE L. J. 64, 79 (1962).
20 Bickel, Reapportionment and Liberal Myths, Commentary, June, 1963, p. 490.
21 FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 17 (Elman ed. 1956).
22 HooK, THE PARADOXES OF FREEDom 66 (1962).
23 See BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 34 ff. (1960).
24 See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24 (1962).
25 For the values reflected in legislation, see Auerbach, Law and Social Change in the
United States, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 516 (1959). Professor Bickel seems to assume, quite erroneously in my opinion, that because legislatures are guided by interest and expediency, their acts
cannot also embody enduring values. This assumption leads him to justify the Supreme Court
as "an institution which stands altogether aside from the current clash of interests, and which,
insofar as is humanly possible, is concerned only with principle." Bickel, op. cit. supra note 24,
at 25. But I do not know any "principle" which does not emerge from the "dash of interests."
I also find it difficult to accept the enunciation and application of "enduring basic values" by
5-4 votes.
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that in the first three decades of this century, the Supreme Court upheld the
sanctity of private property against the claims of a majority of the people which
the legislatures sought to satisfy. While no one should underestimate the historic significance of the Court's role in the current struggle for racial equality,
let us also not forget that the Court held basic Civil Rights Acts of the Reconstruction Period to be unconstitutional in 1883,26 upheld the separate-but-

equal doctrine in 18967 and as late as 1935 ruled, unanimously, that political
parties were purely private organizations entitled to bar Negroes from voting
in their primaries.2 "

Bickel's jibe at Emerson is warranted, but he fails to appreciate its full
significance. Although Emerson thinks Baker v. Carr "moves broadly in the
direction of developing and supporting procedures necessary for the effective
operation of a modem democratic system,"29 he is not a "super-democrat."
He proves this by preceding his praise of the Court for Baker v. Carr with
an aside criticizing the Court for its decisions in the Smith and McCarran
Act cases which he thinks "have no future in the democratic process.""0
While Emerson professes to see the Court "as an institution for supporting
and vitalizing the mechanisms of the democratic process without undertaking
to supervise the results reached by that process,"'" it is a fair guess that he
would not approve the decisions in the Smith Act and McCarran Act cases
even if these acts had unanimously passed a Congress elected from districts
of strictly equal population and had been signed enthusiastically by a President
elected by an overwhelming majority of the popular vote.
But there is also paradox in the position of the champions of judicial
self-restraint on the apportionment issue. Restraint is called for because of
majoitarian assumptions - that the Court is reviewing the acts of representatives who are elected by a majority of the people and who can be turned out
of office if their acts are disapproved by a majority of the people. But when
malapportionment frustrates the possibility of majority rule, the case for
judicial restraint is weakened considerably. Judicial intervention under these
circumstances is not nearly as intolerable as the self-perpetuation of minority
rule. No more suitable role for the Court can be envisaged than to make it
possible for majority rule to function because, without it, the whole idea of
self-government is debased. And past experience gives us every reason to think
that the scope of freedom - including the protection of minority rights - will
expand progressively as the electoral base of our representative institutions
becomes broader and more democratic. Those who share Mr. Justice Frankfurter's intellectual outlook do him a disservice by disparaging the underlying
assumptions of democratic self-government in order to discredit Baker v. Carr.
26
27
28
29
30
Scales

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
Emerson, supra note 19, at 64.
Ibid. Professor Emerson cites "Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See also,
v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) ; Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control

Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961)." Id. n. 3.
31

Id. at 68.

